

SECURITY CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL FOR MOBILE APPLICATIONS

Srinadh Swamy Majeti¹, Barnabas Janet², Narendra P Dhavale³

¹Research Scholar, NIT Trichy & IDRBT Hyderabad, India

²Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Applications, National Institute of Technology(NIT), Trichy, India

³Associate Professor, Centre for Mobile Banking, Institute for Development and Research in Banking Technology(IDRBT), Hyderabad, India

Email: ¹srinathswamy.majety@gmail.com, ²janet@nitt.edu, ³npdhavale@idrbt.ac.in

Abstract

Trend towards use of mobile applications (apps) is increasing resoundingly. Mobile app vendors extend their outreach taking the services to common man. As the technology is evolving at breakneck speed, the threat of unimaginable level of unauthorized activities done by hackers is also increasing. We don't know how secure the apps are? Thus, there is need for organizations to continuously measure their security control domains. In this context, security metrics and standards plays a vital and key role in security management systems. As of our present knowledge, there is no model yet, which can determine security score in particular for mobile apps. To improve the security performance, authors in this work suggested a framework named as Mobile App Security Capability Maturity Model (MASCMM). MASCMM is a 4-step GAME (Goals, Actions, Metrics, Evaluations) process. In the model, 321 Security metrics are defined based on GAP-GOES criteria covering 32 security control domains. By using our proposed framework, organizations can calculate security score and maturity level of each security activity, security control family and also of applications.

Key words: Mobile applications, Mobile app security, security score, CMM level, security metrics, MASCMM, security framework

Introduction

Due to its ongoing tremendous transformation of mobile technology and the remarkable communicative interface, smartphones have become important in our everyday life and activity is undeniably unending. Smartphones have become a colossal point of attention for all mobile users because of its incredible features and results in a whole new and innovative experience in mobile computing. Across the world, 3.5 billion people are using these smartphones [1]. This is made possible through the development of mobile applications (simply apps). Apps are programmed to fulfil our individual needs and requirements thus making life easier, comfortable, and more productive. At the same time, cyberattacks are escalating day-by-day. Hackers are deeply looking into loopholes of these mobile apps causing cyber intrusions and resulting our information to be lost and apps becoming insecure. There is a necessity to increase the measures taken by Application security management system to prevent these attacks. Here, readers must understand the relationship between cybersecurity and Application security. Cyber security is the superset of Application security. Cybersecurity is the process of protecting systems, networks, and programs from digital attacks [2]. In the other end, Application security encompasses measures taken to improve the security of an application often by finding, fixing and preventing security vulnerabilities. Organizations are not following standards, policies completely which degrade the performance of the security management system. These organizations are measuring the security controls sporadically. This became a golden opportunity for hackers. Hence, to gauge the performance of the security management system, security metrics and assessment of security controls act as an epicentre.

Metrics are the tools designed to facilitate decision-making and improve performance and accountability through collection, analysis, and reporting of relevant performance-related data [3]. The advantage of measuring and assessing the security control families will improve the performance of security management system. In this document, the authors will use two similar terms - Metrics and measurement mutually. Measurements are objective raw data and it can be generated by counting [4].

Security metrics defines how many security objectives are satisfied by the organization. Security assessment must be done in perfect manner. According to [5], security assessment must define measurement, meta-metric in a standardized way. The main advantages of security assessment are:

1. Completely identify the security weaknesses of business processes and applications.
2. Able to check whether all the security controls and compliance are perfect.
3. Decide which security issues can be solved in high priority.
4. Are we (organization) achieving desired results?

As of our knowledge, security metric models, frameworks and standards are existing in cyber security area only which are theoretical, complex, hard to apply and context-specific. Mobile application security decision makers instinctively feeling bad and facing trouble to find the appropriate framework and assess the level of the security. The authors are not in intention to blame or criticize or efforts made by researchers are useless. This security research area is an immature field and researchers still actively doing research to make security management wing strong. In this work, the authors defined a security metric framework for mobile applications. The authors identified 32 security control families which mainly affect the performance of security management system and defined metrics. To assess the security, selection of efficient metrics is a difficult task. For this, we defined GAP-GOES meta-metric and based on this, we selected the security metrics. By using the proposed metric framework, organizations can measure assess the level of security. Finally, we validated our framework and compared our framework with existing models of cyber security. The authors will hope; this effort will give comfort to the decision makers for assessing the mobile applications.

Motivation

Mobile Apps are programmed to our individual needs and requirements thus making life more comfortable, easier and more productive. But, we cannot sure that we are using the secured mobile apps [6]. Many researchers did research on security issues of mobile apps. Krutz et. al. made research on mobile apps and tried to find out the relation between security and usability [7]. Akond Rahman et. al. predicted the security of an app by using static metrics [8]. Gemma et. al. [9] defined effort estimation metrics for mobile apps. These metrics will helpful in development phase of an app. Recently, Savola et. al. [10] defined risk driven security metrics for mobile apps. These risk driven metrics not covered all the security control families of an app. Hence, the authors are tried to figure out the metrics which defines the security score of mobile apps and proposed as Mobile App Security Capability Maturity Model (MASCMM). In 2013, W. Krag Brotby and Gray Hinson [5] defined 154 security metrics based on PRAGAMTIC meta-metric in 12 security control domains of cyber security. This really motivates the authors to develop the security metrics for defining mobile app security. The authors identified the security control domains with respect to mobile app security and defined 321 security metrics covering 32 security control families. By using this framework, organizations can calculate the security score of their app. For example, by using MASCMM, bank administration can easily calculate the security score of their banking apps.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews perception about cybersecurity, models and standards, cybersecurity metrics. Section 3 presents proposed list of application security metrics. Section 4 presents mobile application security maturity model framework. Section 5 shows the results obtained by testing the apps with MASCMM framework.

Perception Of Cybersecurity:

2.1 Basic definition of Cybersecurity

The basic concept of security is defined as the quality or extent of being secure [11] .“The integrity of our personal privacy, to security of our critical infrastructure, to military threats and to the protection of intellectual property” is referred as Cybersecurity [12]. According to Gasser and Morrie [13], cybersecurity or IT security is “the protection of information systems from theft or damage to the hardware, the software, and to

the information on them, as well as from disruption or misdirection of the services they provide.” ITU [14] defines Cyber security as “the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and users assets.”

2.2 Cybersecurity Models and Standards:

Cyber security models and standards are useful to determine whether the organizations are implementing the procedures, standards in every security control domain or not. There are many cyber security models and standards exist based on the organization scenario. Issa Atoum et al. [15] classified cyber security models into 7 categories. They are standard models, decision support models, privacy models, infrastructure models, enterprise frameworks, generic frameworks and national frameworks.

2.3 2.3 Cyber Security Maturity Model (CSMM):

CSMM is a powerful tool to improve the organization’s cyber security efforts. It provides a framework for measuring the maturity of a security program and guidance on how to reach the next level. Organizations must use CSMM and evaluate the security level of each entity because cyber space is now fully consisting of viruses, threats, vulnerabilities and many harmful things and we cannot say our organization is secure. CSMM will measure, assess and enhance our security programs. CSMM is derived from Capability Maturity Model (CMM) CMM is a level based framework. In 1989, Humphrey [16] proposed five level CMM numbered from level 1 to level 5, to assess the level of security program. According to Humphrey, Level 1 is “initial”, means simple and less in security, level 2 is “Repeatable”, level 3 is “Defined”, level 4 is “Managed” and Level 5 is “complex” and more secure. To reach any maturity level, the security program must satisfy the defined standards. These maturity levels will provide where to enhance our security programs. For example, suppose, maturity level of one entity is 3, it means that entity satisfies the standards of level 1, 2 and 3. CMM identifies the gaps and gives suggestions/ enhancements to reach the next maturity level i.e. level 4. But, the main drawback of CMM is, it measured only by qualitative metrics.

2.4 Cyber Security Metrics

2.4.1 Metrics, measurement and its relation:

Metrics are the tools designed to facilitate decision-making and improve performance and accountability through collection, analysis, and reporting of relevant performance-related data [17]. If we use metrics in an efficient manner, then we can decide whether the organization is safe or not. It will define the exact state of the organization. Metric and measurement both are exchangeable. Basic definition of metrics is standard of measurement. Metrics are the tools designed to facilitate decision-making and improve performance and accountability through collection, analysis, and reporting of relevant performance-related data. A deep analysis is required to generate the metrics.

In other hand, measurement defined in oxford online dictionary is the act or the process of finding the size, quantity or degree of something. Measurement is the assignment of a number to a characteristic of an object or event, which can be compared with other objects or events. Measurement can be obtained by performing counting.

2.4.2 Importance of Security Metrics:

Security metrics is the way of measuring the effectiveness of organization’s security program. Security metrics are important to every organization because

1. Security metrics define the true/ exact state of cybersecurity posture
2. Completely identify the security weaknesses of business processes and applications.
3. Security metrics will evaluate organization’s compliance with legislation and regulations

4. Able to check whether all the security controls and compliance are perfect.
5. Decide which security issues can be solved in high priority.
6. Are we (organizations) achieving desired results?
7. Security metrics will provide answers to high-level business questions regarding security, which facilitate strategic decision making by the organization's highest levels of management.

2.4.3 Categories of security metrics:

Security metrics are categorized based on different types of security assessments like process based assessment, functional based assessment, level based assessment and type based assessment [18] showed in figure 1.

1. In the organizations, some tasks may be service oriented, some are management related. we can call it as process. Metrics in service oriented, management related activities comes under process based assessment metrics. Process based assessment metrics included related to security governance, risk management, security directness, security policy, business continuity and compliance metrics etc.
2. In addition to this process based assessment, another category of metrics is functional. Independent elements in the process known as functions. Functional based assessment metrics related to HR security, IT security, access control, incident management metrics.
3. Other category of security assessment is based on the level. Level based assessment metrics covers strategic/operational metrics, input/output process metrics, maturity metrics and readiness metrics. Security assessments can be done by higher level persons in the organizations. These persons will take the decisions in a strategic manner. Evaluations happened at operational level. To achieve the results in lower level of organization, level of evaluation is based on the processing input/ output segments. Other level of evaluation is based on the security maturity of an organization. The last level of assessment is based on the readiness on the readiness of the organization.
4. While doing security assessment, type of data about security features may be quantities, some are descriptive and some are in both combinations. Hence, Type based assessment categories are qualitative, quantitative and semi-quantitative.
5. In addition to this, organizations like Centre for Internet Security (CIS) categorized the security metrics into three types namely management metrics, operational metrics and technical metrics.
6. Krag Brotby divided the security metrics into three categories namely strategic security metrics, security management metrics and operational security metrics.
7. Another classification is based on characteristics of metrics like metrics are measured directly or indirectly. Static metrics (without operating security activity) and dynamic metrics (by operating security activity) are other type of characteristics.




Figure 1: Metric categories

2.4.4 Criteria for making metric as Good:

To develop any model, framework or assessment, metrics plays a dominant role. Selection of metrics is not an easy task. In order to make the metrics Good, it must possess some characteristics (or meta-metrics). Many researchers suggested meta-metrics to make security metrics "Good". According to Jilin [19], metrics should be "SMART" - Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Repeatable and Time-dependent. According to [20], security meta-metrics must have features of "CORES" - Clarity, Objectiveness, Repeatability, Easiness and Succinctness. Other characteristics of security metrics include accurate, precise, valid and correct, meaningful, reproducible, objective and able to measure towards a goal [21][22]. According to W. Krag Brotby and Gary Hinson [5], characteristics of security metrics must have the features of "PRAGMATIC" - Predictive, Relevant, Actionable, Genuine, Meaningful, Accurate, Timely, Independent and Cheap.

2.4.5 Need for Application security metrics:

3.5 billion humans are using smartphones. Means, around 44.98% of world population using smartphones. Mobile apps are one of the reason to become smartphones more popular. We can download apps from Playstore. Whenever we are downloading, we know only app rating given by Playstore based on the user ratings. This rating will be usability rating. But, **we don't know security score of the app. How much secure the apps are?** For example, if you are using any Ola app, we know only user rating 3.9 based on user ratings given by 14,15,921 users. But this is not security ranking or security score of Ola app. By using proposed security metrics, app vendors can calculate the security score.

Challenges with Mobile Application security measurement:

1. Application security is ever-evolving beast of new technology, emergent and irreducible. So, we cannot cover all vulnerabilities because new vulnerabilities will arise due to latest technology and old vulnerabilities attacking in newer ways.
2. Developing a security measurement plan and building up the team is bigger challenge.
3. Measure the goals considering organization's objectives.
4. Acquire the knowledge about security standards, vulnerabilities and measures.

2.4.6 Security metrics program

Security metrics program provides direction to manage, control and enhance the performance of security controls. Security metrics program will be set after selecting the security metrics by the organization. To implement the security metrics program, researchers suggested step by step process shown in figure 2. In 2006, Payne et.al. [23] suggested 7 step implementation process. In the same year, Campbell and blades et.al. [24] suggested 5 step implementation process. Kark and stamp et.al [25] suggested 7 step implementation process in 2007. In 2008, Whitman and Mattord et.al. [26] suggested 4 step implementation process. Chew et.al. [27] proposed 5 step implementation process. In 2011, Shon Harris proposed [28] 6 step implementation process. All the researchers proposed security metrics program implantation process based on their views and organization needs.




Figure 2: Implementation process of security metrics program by various researchers

2.4.7 Cyber security levels

Organizations are using cyber security models to calculate security maturity score to each business unit. The authors did literature on various cybersecurity models and maturity levels defined by organizations / researchers shown in figure 3.

In 2005, ISO defined Information Security Management System (ISMS) [29] defines the information security risk management through security standards. ISO defined the maturity levels as level 1: Performed; level 2: Managed; level 3: Established; level 4: Predictable; and level 5: Optimized. To prevent and mitigate incidents and to optimize the use of information, money, people, time and infrastructure, Information Security Management Maturity Model (ISM3) defined by ISM3 Consortium [30] in 2007. In the same year, NIST defined Information Security Maturity Model (ISM2) which provides a framework for review and measure the information security posture of an information security program. To provide security awareness and risk management in large international organizations, in 2009, Gartner defined Gartner's Information Security Awareness Maturity Model (GISMM) [31]. IBM defined an Information Security Framework (ISF) [32] in 2009 for analysing the security gap between business and technology. CERT defined a capability focused process model for managing operational resilience in 2010 and named it as Resilience Management Model (RMM) [33]. Gregory B. White defined Community Cyber Security Maturity Model which defines the community effort and communication capability in communities. In 2012, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in US develops National Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model [34] provides a workforce planning for cyber security best practices. In 2014, again NIST provides Cyber Security Framework [35] which improves federal critical infrastructure through a set of activities designed to develop individual profiles for operators. In 2015, Pamela Curtis defined Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) [36] to assess the implementation and management in critical infrastructure.




Figure 3: Cybersecurity models and its levels

Mobile App Security Capability Maturity Model (Mascmm)

3.1 Security domains

Each department in the security of organization can be defined as security domain or security control family. NIST defined 17 security domains that every organization must implement security strategies in their organization. Krag Brotby et. Al. [5] defined security metrics in 12 security domains. In addition to these, in our proposed model, the authors listed a total of 32 security domains which are important in application security field listed in table 1.

| S. No | Name of security domain | NIST | Krag Brotby et.al. [5] | Proposed model |
|-------|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Access control | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2 | App security metric | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3 | Audit and Accountability | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4 | Awareness and training | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 5 | Business continuity metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 6 | Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 7 | Change management metric | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 8 | Cloud security metrics | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 9 | Compliance assurance metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 10 | Configuration Management | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 11 | Contingency Planning | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 12 | HR security metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 13 | Identification and Authentication | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 14 | Incident Response | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 15 | Information asset management metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 16 | Information Security metric | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 17 | IT security metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 18 | Maintenance | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 19 | Management/Governance metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 20 | Media protection | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 21 | patch management metric | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 22 | Performance and effectiveness metric | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 23 | Personnel security | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 24 | Physical and Environmental Protection | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 25 | Planning | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 26 | Risk Assessment | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 27 | Security policy metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 28 | software security metric | | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 29 | System and Communications Protection | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 30 | System and Information Integrity | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 31 | System and services acquisition | <input type="checkbox"/> | | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 32 | Vulnerability management metric | | | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Table 1: List of security domains

3.2 GAP-GOES criteria:

The basic idea of the GAP-GOES method briefly describe involves scoring application security metrics against seven carefully selected assessment criteria, simply, metametrics. Metametric means meta data, like information about metrics includes metrics about metrics. This GAP-GOES method for selecting application security metrics that are workable, useful and valuable. Core to the GAP-GOES method is a comprehensive set of seven metametrics or criteria for assessing and selecting metrics that together, construct the acronym GAP-GOES.

3.3 Security metric program

Security metric program for scoring application security metrics against GAP-GOES criteria contains 6 steps.

- Step 1: Determine the measurement objectives

The main objective of this step to measure the observation, knowledge of customers of the application security management wing with respect to efficiency and effectiveness so that the department manager can improve and manage the department more successful.

- Step 2: Specify the metrics

In this step, specified the metrics that what things to measure of application security department and who will receive metrics.

- Step 3: Design the metrics

To gather the information about customer perceptions, we conducted opinion survey and feedback forms. We used Likert scale to gain more meaningful granular information and developed the rating guide of GAP-GOES for security metric showed in table 2.

- Step 4: Score the metrics suing the GAP-GOES criteria
 - **Gullibility:** Gullibility security metrics provide unambiguity and not in complex while measuring the artifacts.
 - **Authentic:** Authentic metrics provide credible, straightforward as opposed to false measurement artifacts.
 - **Prompt:** Prompt metrics provide reasonable and accountable information for measuring artifacts.
 - **Guessing:** A good security metric is one that guessable security outcomes implying a strong correlation between metric and outcome
 - **Objectiveness:** Objectiveness security metrics provide metrics that are fairness and uninfluenceable in nature
 - **Eloquent:** A good security metric is one that is eloquent to the intended audience of the metrics. Metrics must be understood by the audience at any time.
 - **Serviceable:** Serviceable metrics gives the idea of a metric being immanently energizing and motivational.

Finally, we calculated GAP-GOES score for each metric. We calculated the average of seven meta metric ratings and rounded to nearest whole number.

- Step 5: Compare the GAP-GOES score against other metrics

In the above steps, it shows specification, development and scoring the metrics. We conducted additional surveying, conducted interviews and scored by assessors before directly interacting with customers. Because it could change our wording of the questions.

| Criterion (GAP-GOES) | Rating Guide | | | |
|-------------------------|---|--|---|--|
| | 0% | 33% | 66% | 100% |
| Gullibility | Looks like complex and time complexity of this metric is high | This metric is unclear however it gives unclear signs while doing future works | This metric generally looks like simple and easy to measure | This metric is gullible in nature and no ambiguity while measuring |
| Authentic | Highly deceitful and phony. In some situations, it is not carrying relation with fact. It is unbelievable | has factors of the fact however there is a dependency on an absence of validity - means questionable on expectations | has feasible validity and backed by valid confirmation | based on valid facts and absolutely valid. No one will object it |
| Prompt | Arbitrary, any coincidence to the evidences are totally accidental | generally appears slow, it sets the capability while using | This metric generally prompts in perfect moment however it will be extra benefit if it appears speedily | This metric can be used instantly and maintaining data perfectly and available any time |
| Guessing | It is entirely classic and cannot guess the value | basically classic but provide an unclear sign of next works to be done like uncertain tendency | Obviously guessable but there is a mistrust | Extremely guessable, no ambiguity on works carried out in next days |
| Objectiveness | The metric can be easily influenced by the feelings of evaluator and unfairness in nature | generally it appears to be unfairness but while using it leads to unambiguous and uncertainty | The metric looks like fairness and carries objectivity | This metric was uninfluenceable and provide results based on observable experience |
| Eloquent | Unconditionally eloquent and causes distraction to all beneficiaries | it is a kind of unclear and unambiguous to all beneficiaries | Almost all the beneficiaries can derive simply what this metric measures | This metric is hugely eloquent and clearly understands by all beneficiaries |
| Serviceable | Beneficiaries don't know the opinion of this metric and nothing would do by beneficiaries | This metric will give clue, might give a small reply | This metric provides a favourable escort, would give an appropriate reply | This metric provides an acceptable and straight actionable and surely cause an perfect reply |

Table 2: Rating guide for GAP-GOES criteria

3.4 List of security metrics

Based on the security metric program mentioned in 3.3, the authors listed 321 security metrics in 32 security domains. The table 3 showing various security metrics in security domains and average GAP-GOES score of security metric evaluated by using the above rating guide.

| S.No | Name of security metric | G | A | P | G | O | E | S | Score (%) |
|--------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|-----------|
| Access control | | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | Rate of messages received at central access logging/alerting system | 66 | 96 | 79 | 77 | 93 | 78 | 65 | 79 |
| 2 | Information access control maturity | 74 | 80 | 74 | 83 | 83 | 77 | 97 | 81 |
| 3 | Days since logical access control matrices for application systems were last reviewed | 67 | 74 | 63 | 81 | 67 | 80 | 76 | 73 |
| 4 | Percentage of inactive user accounts that have been disabled in accordance with policy | 68 | 76 | 66 | 93 | 90 | 67 | 85 | 78 |
| 5 | Rate of detection of access anomalies | 76 | 71 | 92 | 63 | 65 | 85 | 72 | 75 |
| 6 | Logical access control matrices for applications: <i>coverage and detail</i> | 81 | 63 | 65 | 90 | 94 | 80 | 65 | 77 |
| 7 | Logical access control matrices for applications: <i>state of development</i> | 84 | 82 | 92 | 86 | 93 | 92 | 82 | 87 |
| 8 | Quality of identification and authentication controls | 67 | 70 | 85 | 77 | 74 | 93 | 81 | 78 |
| 9 | Percentage of business units that have proven their identification and authentication mechanisms | 95 | 65 | 80 | 80 | 87 | 94 | 97 | 85 |
| 10 | Number of times that assets were accessed without authentication or validation | 89 | 69 | 93 | 66 | 91 | 74 | 75 | 80 |
| 11 | Percentage of remote access points used to gain unauthorized access | 84 | 69 | 64 | 76 | 96 | 85 | 82 | 79 |
| App security metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 12 | Number of secured applications in the organization | 75 | 96 | 70 | 77 | 94 | 65 | 72 | 78 |
| 13 | Percent of Critical Applications | 73 | 81 | 87 | 75 | 85 | 81 | 78 | 80 |
| 14 | Risk Assessment Coverage | 72 | 64 | 90 | 81 | 94 | 88 | 64 | 79 |
| 15 | Security Testing Coverage | 92 | 76 | 63 | 92 | 65 | 87 | 88 | 80 |
| Audit and Accountability | | | | | | | | | |
| 16 | Average frequency of audit records review and analysis for inappropriate activity | 69 | 79 | 91 | 69 | 85 | 71 | 75 | 77 |
| 17 | Are there audit requirements? | 80 | 65 | 89 | 74 | 71 | 67 | 80 | 75 |
| 18 | How Satisfied Are the Internal Stakeholders? | 67 | 79 | 92 | 83 | 93 | 83 | 79 | 82 |
| 19 | What was the financial value of the internal audit? | 78 | 73 | 65 | 75 | 83 | 82 | 96 | 79 |
| 20 | How was the performance reported? | 67 | 83 | 92 | 92 | 66 | 65 | 78 | 78 |
| 21 | What was the audit plan coverage? | 67 | 66 | 68 | 66 | 64 | 85 | 86 | 72 |
| 22 | How rapidly were issues remediated? | 85 | 86 | 94 | 89 | 74 | 83 | 90 | 86 |
| 23 | Does the organization collect and review audit logs associated with all remote access points? | 82 | 83 | 81 | 71 | 84 | 83 | 78 | 80 |
| 24 | Does the organization have clearly defined criteria for what constitutes evidence of inappropriate activity within system audit logs? | 88 | 90 | 83 | 95 | 97 | 63 | 64 | 83 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 25 | For the reporting period, how many system audit logs have been reviewed within the following time frames for inappropriate activity? | 85 | 81 | 92 | 80 | 72 | 90 | 81 | 83 |
| 26 | Audit and Accountability Policy and Procedures | 71 | 78 | 76 | 91 | 88 | 79 | 86 | 81 |
| 27 | Response to Audit Processing Failures | 90 | 70 | 80 | 66 | 75 | 80 | 69 | 76 |
| 28 | Audit Record Retention | 66 | 66 | 87 | 63 | 86 | 70 | 79 | 74 |
| Awareness and training | | | | | | | | | |
| 29 | Number of Email Breaches Avoided or Detected | 81 | 73 | 78 | 91 | 67 | 97 | 86 | 82 |
| 30 | Clean Desk Index | 65 | 68 | 82 | 71 | 80 | 75 | 70 | 73 |
| 31 | Password Security | 79 | 84 | 74 | 88 | 77 | 93 | 65 | 80 |
| 32 | New Types of Attacks, Identified | 72 | 69 | 67 | 66 | 88 | 86 | 78 | 75 |
| 33 | Training attendance | 91 | 67 | 86 | 67 | 96 | 90 | 89 | 84 |
| 34 | NIST training security awareness checklist score | 68 | 63 | 68 | 90 | 88 | 77 | 88 | 77 |
| 35 | Percentage of information system security personnel that have received security training. | 82 | 81 | 91 | 78 | 66 | 64 | 79 | 77 |
| Business continuity metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 36 | Coverage of business impact analyses | 95 | 68 | 70 | 63 | 93 | 77 | 66 | 76 |
| 37 | Business continuity management maturity | 94 | 93 | 97 | 76 | 67 | 88 | 76 | 84 |
| 38 | Percentage of critical business processes having adequate business continuity arrangements | 78 | 68 | 83 | 92 | 96 | 76 | 70 | 80 |
| 39 | Percentage of business processes having defined RTOs and RPOs | 64 | 84 | 81 | 69 | 79 | 80 | 75 | 76 |
| 40 | Business continuity plan maintenance status | 77 | 90 | 97 | 64 | 79 | 70 | 75 | 79 |
| 41 | Disaster recovery test results | 80 | 79 | 85 | 68 | 93 | 83 | 87 | 82 |
| 42 | Uptime | 64 | 64 | 93 | 74 | 67 | 74 | 78 | 73 |
| 43 | IT capacity and performance | 64 | 75 | 77 | 74 | 92 | 95 | 75 | 79 |
| 44 | Mapping critical business processes to disaster recovery and business continuity plans | 89 | 90 | 81 | 88 | 86 | 70 | 73 | 82 |
| 45 | Business continuity expenditure | 82 | 71 | 93 | 76 | 88 | 79 | 87 | 82 |
| 46 | Percentage of critical systems reviewed for compliance with critical control requirements | 78 | 82 | 82 | 93 | 77 | 80 | 97 | 84 |
| Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessments | | | | | | | | | |
| 47 | Ensure that the controls are effectively implemented through established verification techniques and procedures and give organization officials confidence that the appropriate safeguards and countermeasures are in place to protect the organization's information. | 73 | 83 | 79 | 74 | 63 | 66 | 77 | 74 |
| 48 | Has a security certification and accreditation of the system been completed? | 88 | 67 | 75 | 83 | 80 | 68 | 76 | 77 |
| 49 | Has the security certification and accreditation status been verified? | 64 | 87 | 63 | 90 | 87 | 72 | 90 | 79 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 50 | Are there security features in place to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the data and the systems being interconnected? | 94 | 75 | 64 | 75 | 63 | 64 | 80 | 74 |
| 51 | Are there titles of the formal security policy(ies) that govern each system? | 63 | 80 | 69 | 92 | 74 | 86 | 79 | 78 |
| 52 | percentage of systems accredited | 87 | 91 | 87 | 73 | 93 | 84 | 95 | 87 |
| 53 | Does management ensure that corrective information security actions are tracked using the Plan of Action & Milestones (POA&M) process? | 67 | 76 | 63 | 65 | 73 | 67 | 76 | 70 |
| Change management metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 54 | Mean-Time to Complete Changes | 84 | 80 | 82 | 94 | 87 | 79 | 64 | 81 |
| 55 | Percent of Changes with Security Reviews | 77 | 77 | 87 | 76 | 76 | 67 | 94 | 79 |
| 56 | Percent of Changes with Security Exceptions | 74 | 63 | 77 | 86 | 95 | 89 | 79 | 80 |
| 57 | Number of changes | 78 | 86 | 69 | 88 | 84 | 85 | 64 | 79 |
| Cloud security metrics | | | | | | | | | |
| 58 | Percentage of time in which data access is available to data owners | 85 | 96 | 71 | 73 | 73 | 93 | 97 | 84 |
| 59 | Percentage of time in which service access is available to users | 66 | 79 | 78 | 90 | 95 | 75 | 88 | 82 |
| 60 | Total expenses incurred due to compensatory damages | 87 | 94 | 70 | 93 | 91 | 82 | 82 | 86 |
| 61 | Average expenses due to compensatory damages | 97 | 63 | 84 | 91 | 93 | 93 | 64 | 84 |
| 62 | Cost of Incidents in cloud | 71 | 66 | 67 | 94 | 68 | 73 | 70 | 73 |
| 63 | Mean Cost of cloud Incidences | 92 | 71 | 63 | 66 | 64 | 76 | 85 | 74 |
| 64 | Mean Incident Recovery Cost | 64 | 68 | 63 | 77 | 68 | 73 | 73 | 69 |
| 65 | Mean Cost to Patch in cloud | 88 | 94 | 88 | 86 | 78 | 67 | 88 | 84 |
| 66 | Datacenter Location | 69 | 88 | 87 | 64 | 69 | 91 | 80 | 78 |
| 67 | Detection of Write-Serializability (WS) violation | 96 | 74 | 73 | 89 | 83 | 88 | 85 | 84 |
| 68 | Detection of Read-Freshness (RF) violation | 70 | 71 | 82 | 75 | 70 | 76 | 81 | 75 |
| 69 | Detection of Forward Secrecy (FS) violation | 69 | 85 | 64 | 69 | 79 | 82 | 72 | 74 |
| 70 | HTTP Strict Transport Security Activation | 76 | 68 | 71 | 67 | 86 | 78 | 88 | 76 |
| 71 | HTTP to HTTPS redirect activation | 84 | 64 | 95 | 93 | 70 | 80 | 72 | 80 |
| 72 | Secure Cookies Enforcement | 75 | 76 | 83 | 64 | 64 | 93 | 90 | 78 |
| 73 | Certificate Pinning Activation | 92 | 88 | 88 | 77 | 63 | 68 | 75 | 79 |
| 74 | Vulnerability Scanning Frequency | 85 | 95 | 70 | 74 | 71 | 97 | 80 | 82 |
| 75 | Vulnerability-List Update Frequency | 68 | 81 | 90 | 91 | 66 | 95 | 67 | 80 |
| 76 | SW Update Check Frequency | 81 | 88 | 95 | 97 | 74 | 91 | 93 | 88 |
| 77 | Audit Record Generation Frequency | 88 | 87 | 68 | 76 | 67 | 72 | 90 | 78 |
| 78 | Level of confidentiality | 76 | 71 | 82 | 86 | 83 | 75 | 95 | 81 |
| 79 | Key Exposure Level | 79 | 97 | 90 | 65 | 86 | 94 | 65 | 82 |
| 80 | Account of Privacy and Security Training | 94 | 88 | 85 | 69 | 70 | 89 | 73 | 81 |
| 81 | Data Isolation Testing Level | 96 | 84 | 69 | 75 | 77 | 79 | 93 | 82 |
| 82 | Type of consent | 65 | 69 | 72 | 89 | 80 | 83 | 92 | 79 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 83 | Type of notice | 97 | 92 | 67 | 67 | 74 | 83 | 92 | 82 |
| 84 | Procedures for Data Subject Access Requests | 97 | 76 | 88 | 96 | 97 | 72 | 63 | 84 |
| 85 | Readability (Flesch Reading Ease Test) | 83 | 80 | 85 | 70 | 65 | 70 | 91 | 78 |
| 86 | Rank of Responsibility for Privacy | 92 | 84 | 91 | 83 | 97 | 75 | 79 | 86 |
| 87 | Log Unalterability | 77 | 84 | 93 | 87 | 65 | 63 | 83 | 79 |
| 88 | Identity Assurance | 78 | 96 | 91 | 85 | 97 | 97 | 88 | 90 |
| 89 | Type of incident notification | 82 | 69 | 68 | 97 | 91 | 68 | 90 | 81 |
| 90 | Cryptographic Strength | 83 | 85 | 81 | 79 | 78 | 64 | 83 | 79 |
| 91 | Level of Redundancy | 88 | 91 | 80 | 77 | 86 | 83 | 89 | 85 |
| 92 | Level of Diversity | 75 | 71 | 82 | 85 | 85 | 74 | 95 | 81 |
| Compliance assurance metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 93 | Information security compliance management maturity | 75 | 95 | 63 | 69 | 95 | 77 | 92 | 81 |
| 94 | Breakdown of exceptions and exemptions | 92 | 69 | 82 | 82 | 75 | 79 | 74 | 79 |
| 95 | Number and severity of findings in audit reports, reviews, assessments <i>etc.</i> | 89 | 65 | 85 | 89 | 84 | 80 | 81 | 82 |
| 96 | Status of compliance with externally-imposed information security obligations | 75 | 75 | 85 | 80 | 86 | 76 | 66 | 78 |
| 97 | Historic consequences of noncompliance | 74 | 77 | 76 | 65 | 95 | 83 | 77 | 78 |
| 98 | Number of systems whose security has been accredited | 91 | 95 | 93 | 88 | 70 | 95 | 92 | 89 |
| 99 | Status of compliance with internally-mandated (corporate) information security requirements | 75 | 75 | 65 | 97 | 80 | 68 | 71 | 76 |
| 100 | Number of unapproved/unlicensed software installations identified on corporate IT equipment | 75 | 95 | 91 | 92 | 72 | 91 | 86 | 86 |
| 101 | Percentage of security policies supported by adequate compliance activities | 91 | 67 | 85 | 93 | 71 | 77 | 65 | 78 |
| 102 | Compliance benchmark against peers | 73 | 95 | 68 | 93 | 88 | 93 | 74 | 83 |
| 103 | Number or rate of security policy noncompliance infractions detected | 82 | 72 | 70 | 78 | 92 | 73 | 76 | 78 |
| 104 | Embarrassment factor | 83 | 73 | 94 | 81 | 82 | 88 | 80 | 83 |
| 105 | Percentage of purchased software that is unauthorized | 86 | 75 | 70 | 79 | 80 | 63 | 88 | 77 |
| 106 | Proportionality of expenditure on assurance <i>versus</i> potential impact x likelihood | 78 | 76 | 83 | 73 | 66 | 85 | 83 | 78 |
| 107 | Percentage of software licenses purchased but not accounted for in repository | 78 | 72 | 88 | 69 | 72 | 73 | 78 | 76 |
| 108 | Percentage of critical information assets residing on fully compliant systems | 73 | 89 | 79 | 84 | 91 | 64 | 88 | 81 |
| Configuration Management | | | | | | | | | |
| 109 | Percentage of Configuration Compliance | 83 | 76 | 85 | 84 | 77 | 89 | 84 | 83 |
| 110 | Configuration Management Coverage | 91 | 90 | 82 | 83 | 97 | 75 | 96 | 88 |
| 111 | Current Anti-Malware Compliance | 81 | 63 | 89 | 68 | 63 | 81 | 92 | 77 |
| 112 | Percentage approved and implemented configuration changes identified in the latest automated configuration | 74 | 94 | 66 | 68 | 63 | 85 | 81 | 76 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------------|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 113 | Percentage of servers within a system with a standard configuration | 97 | 79 | 77 | 78 | 89 | 97 | 81 | 85 |
| Contingency Planning | | | | | | | | | |
| 114 | Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD) | 73 | 75 | 87 | 83 | 78 | 83 | 68 | 78 |
| 115 | Recovery Time Objective (RTO) | 80 | 96 | 78 | 90 | 96 | 97 | 69 | 87 |
| 116 | Recovery Point Objective (RPO) | 66 | 86 | 73 | 65 | 85 | 79 | 71 | 75 |
| 117 | Work Recovery Time (WRT) | 75 | 97 | 79 | 83 | 94 | 71 | 87 | 84 |
| 118 | Percentage (%) of information systems that have conducted annual contingency plan testing | 88 | 86 | 76 | 78 | 66 | 63 | 92 | 78 |
| HR security metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 119 | Human resources security maturity | 74 | 97 | 79 | 78 | 92 | 74 | 81 | 82 |
| 120 | Security awareness level | 65 | 78 | 86 | 78 | 87 | 75 | 65 | 76 |
| 121 | Rate of change in employee turnover and/or absenteeism | 94 | 79 | 70 | 86 | 82 | 68 | 78 | 80 |
| 122 | Staff morale & attitude | 86 | 69 | 78 | 87 | 82 | 69 | 87 | 80 |
| 123 | Tone at the top | 73 | 82 | 93 | 81 | 75 | 84 | 70 | 80 |
| 124 | Corporate security culture | 96 | 78 | 72 | 85 | 71 | 86 | 86 | 82 |
| 125 | System accounts-to-employees ratio | 65 | 89 | 83 | 76 | 95 | 76 | 69 | 79 |
| 126 | Opinion surveys and direct observations of the culture | 90 | 73 | 63 | 78 | 71 | 81 | 80 | 77 |
| 127 | Help desk security traffic volumes | 74 | 96 | 72 | 75 | 71 | 66 | 76 | 76 |
| 128 | Culture / world view | 97 | 73 | 89 | 97 | 65 | 74 | 88 | 83 |
| 129 | Employee turn <i>versus</i> account churn | 91 | 88 | 63 | 63 | 87 | 66 | 75 | 76 |
| 130 | Organizational dysfunction | 71 | 86 | 78 | 78 | 69 | 95 | 65 | 77 |
| 131 | Psychometrics | 66 | 88 | 97 | 86 | 94 | 95 | 77 | 86 |
| Identification and Authentication | | | | | | | | | |
| 132 | Time To Provision, Authorize, or deprovision | 83 | 90 | 71 | 89 | 95 | 90 | 78 | 85 |
| 133 | Number Of 'Ghost Accounts' | 66 | 80 | 80 | 93 | 77 | 93 | 94 | 83 |
| 134 | Password Hygiene Metrics | 91 | 74 | 77 | 95 | 76 | 83 | 97 | 85 |
| 135 | Percentage of users with access to share accounts | 66 | 91 | 67 | 82 | 65 | 78 | 68 | 74 |
| Incident Response | | | | | | | | | |
| 136 | Cost of Incidents | 93 | 73 | 70 | 63 | 68 | 92 | 70 | 76 |
| 137 | Mean Cost of Incidents | 81 | 91 | 75 | 89 | 78 | 64 | 92 | 81 |
| 138 | Mean Incident Recovery Cost | 68 | 65 | 64 | 93 | 77 | 97 | 70 | 76 |
| 139 | Mean-Time to Incident Discovery | 70 | 90 | 74 | 77 | 71 | 70 | 68 | 74 |
| 140 | Number of Incidents | 77 | 79 | 88 | 66 | 89 | 67 | 71 | 77 |
| 141 | Mean-Time Between Security Incidents | 91 | 66 | 87 | 73 | 66 | 94 | 64 | 77 |
| 142 | Mean-Time to Incident Recovery | 95 | 95 | 78 | 95 | 84 | 69 | 79 | 85 |
| 143 | Percentage of incidents reported within required time frame per applicable incident category | 79 | 94 | 94 | 89 | 66 | 84 | 71 | 82 |
| 144 | Information security incident management maturity | 79 | 96 | 68 | 79 | 72 | 85 | 77 | 79 |
| 145 | Time taken to remediate security incidents | 77 | 67 | 69 | 69 | 71 | 73 | 97 | 75 |
| 146 | Time lag between incident and detection | 66 | 87 | 73 | 94 | 86 | 77 | 80 | 80 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 147 | Percentage of incidents for which root causes have been diagnosed and addressed | 85 | 65 | 80 | 84 | 64 | 84 | 89 | 79 |
| 148 | Cumulative costs of information security incidents to date | 69 | 81 | 74 | 83 | 74 | 75 | 73 | 76 |
| 149 | Number of information security events and incidents, major and minor | 71 | 71 | 70 | 85 | 85 | 88 | 84 | 79 |
| 150 | Number of information security incidents that could have been prevented, mitigated or avoided | 94 | 84 | 89 | 79 | 97 | 84 | 80 | 87 |
| 151 | Non-financial impacts of incidents | 79 | 89 | 91 | 75 | 64 | 67 | 82 | 78 |
| Information asset management metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 152 | Number of orphaned information assets without an owner | 96 | 69 | 74 | 63 | 64 | 65 | 65 | 71 |
| 153 | Information asset management maturity | 66 | 85 | 84 | 83 | 86 | 87 | 85 | 82 |
| 154 | Percentage of information assets not [correctly] classified | 79 | 87 | 65 | 72 | 81 | 79 | 63 | 75 |
| 155 | Unowned information asset days | 71 | 89 | 66 | 91 | 81 | 93 | 74 | 81 |
| 156 | Integrity of the information asset inventory | 80 | 79 | 83 | 66 | 74 | 92 | 87 | 80 |
| 157 | Value of information assets owned by each Information Asset Owner | 77 | 90 | 72 | 71 | 75 | 89 | 64 | 77 |
| 158 | Percentage of information assets not marked with the [correct] classification | 93 | 83 | 63 | 64 | 95 | 88 | 93 | 83 |
| Information Security metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 159 | Level of preparedness | 85 | 76 | 90 | 64 | 94 | 88 | 95 | 85 |
| 160 | Unidentified devices on internal networks | 95 | 96 | 88 | 68 | 74 | 73 | 74 | 81 |
| 161 | Intrusion attempts | 76 | 76 | 93 | 63 | 64 | 80 | 82 | 76 |
| 162 | Security incidents | 91 | 75 | 89 | 77 | 72 | 76 | 67 | 78 |
| 163 | Mean Time to Detect (MTTD) | 69 | 82 | 79 | 92 | 84 | 96 | 71 | 82 |
| 164 | Mean Time to Resolve (MTTR) | 91 | 86 | 92 | 82 | 76 | 66 | 85 | 83 |
| 165 | Mean Time to Contain (MTTC) | 63 | 69 | 64 | 82 | 80 | 82 | 97 | 77 |
| 166 | First party security ratings | 71 | 90 | 87 | 84 | 73 | 63 | 70 | 77 |
| 167 | Average vendor security rating | 90 | 97 | 67 | 86 | 74 | 66 | 74 | 79 |
| 168 | Mean time for vendors to respond to security incidents | 88 | 93 | 95 | 90 | 97 | 89 | 64 | 88 |
| IT security metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 169 | IT security maturity | 80 | 92 | 85 | 77 | 96 | 64 | 87 | 83 |
| 170 | Percentage of systems checked and fully compliant to applicable (technical) security standards | 73 | 87 | 75 | 83 | 68 | 64 | 64 | 73 |
| 171 | Time from change approval to change | 91 | 94 | 97 | 95 | 74 | 67 | 69 | 84 |
| 172 | Correlation between system/configuration logs and authorized change requests | 74 | 66 | 75 | 88 | 69 | 66 | 72 | 73 |
| 173 | Percentage of IT devices not securely configured | 71 | 96 | 68 | 82 | 67 | 91 | 70 | 78 |
| 174 | Rate of change of emergency change requests | 74 | 89 | 76 | 73 | 70 | 69 | 88 | 77 |
| 175 | Percentage of highly privileged/trusted users or functions | 79 | 70 | 70 | 88 | 73 | 87 | 89 | 79 |
| 176 | Entropy of encrypted content | 92 | 74 | 72 | 71 | 71 | 69 | 81 | 76 |
| 177 | Percentage of IT/process changes abandoned, backed-out or failed for information security reasons | 90 | 65 | 93 | 65 | 93 | 87 | 88 | 83 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 178 | Perceptions of rate of change in IT | 96 | 78 | 77 | 63 | 69 | 75 | 67 | 75 |
| 179 | Number of viruses detected in user files | 97 | 92 | 66 | 96 | 85 | 86 | 63 | 84 |
| 180 | Number of firewall rules changed | 81 | 96 | 74 | 93 | 93 | 86 | 81 | 86 |
| 181 | Toxicity rate of customer data | 68 | 64 | 90 | 83 | 73 | 97 | 64 | 77 |
| Maintenance | | | | | | | | | |
| 182 | Planned maintenance percentage (PPC) | 63 | 75 | 67 | 92 | 73 | 83 | 89 | 77 |
| 183 | Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) | 87 | 91 | 70 | 63 | 74 | 82 | 66 | 76 |
| 184 | Mean time to repair (MTTR) | 82 | 68 | 70 | 90 | 65 | 63 | 93 | 76 |
| 185 | Mean time between failure (MTBF) | 73 | 86 | 90 | 96 | 76 | 75 | 74 | 81 |
| 186 | Preventive maintenance compliance (PMC) | 68 | 64 | 82 | 69 | 95 | 88 | 63 | 76 |
| 187 | Maintenance Performance Measurement (MPM) | 68 | 94 | 66 | 95 | 90 | 88 | 64 | 81 |
| 188 | Unscheduled maintenance downtime | 79 | 86 | 67 | 83 | 90 | 94 | 66 | 81 |
| 189 | Percentage Available man hours used in proactive work | 93 | 64 | 83 | 95 | 94 | 63 | 67 | 80 |
| 190 | Number of work order requests | 94 | 70 | 71 | 85 | 94 | 88 | 77 | 83 |
| 191 | Percentage Scheduled man hours over total available man hours | 94 | 96 | 66 | 73 | 73 | 76 | 89 | 81 |
| 192 | Percentage Maintenance cost over replacement value | 87 | 66 | 96 | 91 | 69 | 81 | 87 | 82 |
| 193 | Percentage Maintenance cost over sales revenue | 65 | 91 | 71 | 63 | 87 | 94 | 77 | 78 |
| 194 | Maintenance cost per product unit | 87 | 90 | 91 | 89 | 93 | 68 | 68 | 84 |
| 195 | Number of safety, health and environment incidents | 92 | 84 | 70 | 71 | 77 | 69 | 64 | 75 |
| Management/Governance metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 196 | Quality of security metrics in use | 90 | 89 | 92 | 93 | 95 | 67 | 85 | 87 |
| 197 | Percentage of security controls that may fail silently | 92 | 66 | 79 | 85 | 64 | 70 | 69 | 75 |
| 198 | Security governance maturity | 93 | 95 | 68 | 78 | 70 | 85 | 86 | 82 |
| 199 | Information security ascendancy | 80 | 97 | 89 | 69 | 78 | 74 | 91 | 83 |
| 200 | Percentage of controls unambiguously linked to control objectives | 86 | 94 | 78 | 97 | 85 | 78 | 66 | 83 |
| 201 | Number of controls meeting defined control criteria/objectives | 73 | 72 | 77 | 68 | 74 | 85 | 85 | 76 |
| 202 | Percentage of critical controls consistent with controls policy | 72 | 76 | 82 | 91 | 90 | 74 | 76 | 80 |
| 203 | Corporation's economic situation | 82 | 76 | 66 | 67 | 68 | 94 | 80 | 76 |
| 204 | Percentage of controls that are ossified or redundant | 97 | 72 | 90 | 92 | 84 | 81 | 97 | 88 |
| 205 | Control objectives tied to specific business objectives | 97 | 79 | 93 | 72 | 72 | 74 | 95 | 83 |
| 206 | Days since the last serious information security incident | 90 | 94 | 83 | 91 | 69 | 94 | 93 | 88 |
| 207 | Annual cost of information security controls | 63 | 95 | 90 | 65 | 65 | 63 | 95 | 77 |
| 208 | Number of different controls | 93 | 83 | 83 | 70 | 94 | 70 | 85 | 83 |
| 209 | Extent of accountability for information assets | 89 | 64 | 92 | 89 | 73 | 93 | 76 | 82 |
| 210 | Information security expenditure | 64 | 80 | 80 | 95 | 89 | 91 | 77 | 82 |
| 211 | Benford's law | 78 | 63 | 82 | 66 | 97 | 81 | 65 | 76 |
| 212 | NPV (Net Present Value) | 79 | 65 | 87 | 75 | 91 | 74 | 69 | 77 |
| 213 | ROI (Return On Investment) | 80 | 74 | 75 | 69 | 92 | 88 | 73 | 79 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 214 | IRR (Internal Rate of Return) | 94 | 76 | 75 | 65 | 88 | 96 | 76 | 81 |
| 215 | Payback period | 90 | 85 | 63 | 71 | 65 | 67 | 77 | 74 |
| 216 | Information Security Management customer satisfaction rating | 77 | 76 | 89 | 89 | 85 | 89 | 87 | 85 |
| 217 | Information security controls coverage | 93 | 73 | 90 | 88 | 64 | 74 | 92 | 82 |
| 218 | DEFCON level | 75 | 73 | 95 | 75 | 85 | 87 | 85 | 82 |
| 219 | Controls consistency | 78 | 79 | 83 | 76 | 95 | 95 | 95 | 86 |
| 220 | Scope of information security activities | 96 | 89 | 83 | 90 | 76 | 91 | 93 | 88 |
| 221 | VAR (Value At Risk) | 65 | 89 | 87 | 83 | 93 | 78 | 96 | 84 |
| 222 | ROSI (Return on Security Investment) | 80 | 70 | 92 | 96 | 80 | 73 | 96 | 84 |
| 223 | Security budget as % of IT budget or turnover | 85 | 78 | 82 | 94 | 68 | 86 | 79 | 82 |
| Media protection | | | | | | | | | |
| 224 | Determine sanitization level | 80 | 71 | 96 | 67 | 71 | 90 | 64 | 77 |
| 225 | media sanitization efforts | 76 | 92 | 81 | 64 | 76 | 90 | 77 | 79 |
| 226 | Heat-resistant and waterproof containers for backup media | 72 | 82 | 96 | 72 | 90 | 89 | 65 | 81 |
| 227 | System recovery on an alternate platform from backup media | 63 | 86 | 80 | 83 | 78 | 79 | 67 | 77 |
| Patch management metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 228 | Patch Policy Compliance | 73 | 88 | 71 | 94 | 93 | 82 | 82 | 83 |
| 229 | Patch Management Coverage | 88 | 65 | 84 | 66 | 96 | 85 | 69 | 79 |
| 230 | Mean-Time to Patch | 91 | 84 | 77 | 97 | 75 | 80 | 96 | 86 |
| 231 | Mean Cost to Patch | 84 | 81 | 86 | 84 | 78 | 82 | 76 | 82 |
| 232 | Delays and inconsistencies in patching | 88 | 76 | 70 | 97 | 80 | 78 | 96 | 84 |
| 233 | Patching cadence | 74 | 65 | 87 | 85 | 97 | 90 | 92 | 84 |
| 234 | Vendor patching cadence | 91 | 72 | 94 | 93 | 77 | 66 | 68 | 80 |
| Performance and effectiveness metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 235 | Metrics for measuring phishing susceptibility | 92 | 76 | 63 | 89 | 82 | 80 | 69 | 79 |
| 236 | Metrics for measuring malware susceptibility | 90 | 80 | 88 | 79 | 94 | 78 | 91 | 86 |
| 237 | Metrics for measuring password vulnerabilities | 92 | 78 | 69 | 76 | 72 | 74 | 95 | 79 |
| 238 | password meter metric | 69 | 74 | 81 | 66 | 79 | 93 | 77 | 77 |
| 239 | CWSS score | 69 | 72 | 86 | 66 | 86 | 89 | 96 | 81 |
| 240 | Encounter rate | 66 | 70 | 81 | 66 | 84 | 94 | 74 | 76 |
| 241 | Blocking rate | 73 | 73 | 83 | 88 | 80 | 77 | 76 | 79 |
| 242 | Breach frequency rate | 64 | 77 | 68 | 73 | 66 | 84 | 70 | 72 |
| 243 | time to first compromise metric | 77 | 86 | 88 | 74 | 71 | 89 | 94 | 83 |
| 244 | Penetration resistance metric | 88 | 66 | 63 | 86 | 64 | 78 | 68 | 73 |
| 245 | Network diversity | 86 | 71 | 76 | 78 | 77 | 71 | 65 | 75 |
| 246 | metrics for measuring zero day attacks | 67 | 92 | 89 | 79 | 94 | 66 | 68 | 79 |
| 247 | Metrics for measuring malware spreading | 97 | 66 | 75 | 82 | 93 | 86 | 70 | 81 |
| 248 | metrics for measuring obfuscation attacks | 77 | 96 | 64 | 93 | 74 | 92 | 96 | 85 |
| 249 | cybersecurity posture metric | 91 | 65 | 65 | 73 | 87 | 64 | 83 | 75 |

| Personnel security | | | | | | | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 250 | Ensuring that the agency has trained personnel to support compliance with information security policies, processes, standards, and guidelines | 94 | 96 | 96 | 97 | 87 | 78 | 71 | 88 |
| 251 | Personnel turnover | 66 | 95 | 68 | 82 | 64 | 96 | 79 | 79 |
| 252 | Ensure system users and support personnel receive the requisite security training | 85 | 79 | 86 | 75 | 97 | 95 | 69 | 84 |
| Physical and Environmental Protection | | | | | | | | | |
| 253 | Power consumed by the computer suite <i>versus</i> air conditioning capacity | 83 | 91 | 97 | 77 | 67 | 92 | 80 | 84 |
| 254 | Physical and environmental security maturity | 68 | 90 | 73 | 90 | 88 | 87 | 81 | 82 |
| 255 | Discrepancies between physical location and logical access location | 90 | 87 | 64 | 68 | 67 | 79 | 69 | 75 |
| 256 | Number of unsecured access points | 97 | 87 | 91 | 76 | 76 | 93 | 84 | 86 |
| 257 | Number of unacceptable physical risks on premises | 80 | 72 | 67 | 86 | 68 | 97 | 64 | 76 |
| 258 | Distance between employee and visitor parking | 65 | 65 | 94 | 70 | 95 | 88 | 91 | 81 |
| 259 | Percentage of facilities that have adequate external lighting | 94 | 69 | 79 | 94 | 80 | 80 | 69 | 81 |
| 260 | Percentage of physical security incidents allowing unauthorized entry into facilities containing information systems | 95 | 79 | 90 | 92 | 82 | 76 | 76 | 84 |
| Planning | | | | | | | | | |
| 261 | Cost Variance | 97 | 80 | 73 | 66 | 71 | 91 | 66 | 78 |
| 262 | Resource capacity utilization | 79 | 95 | 68 | 74 | 90 | 70 | 94 | 81 |
| 263 | Group and project portfolio utilization | 64 | 66 | 81 | 88 | 93 | 89 | 91 | 82 |
| 264 | Planned resources vs. resources in use | 97 | 76 | 72 | 72 | 87 | 85 | 97 | 84 |
| 265 | Planned time vs Used time | 88 | 88 | 94 | 66 | 95 | 81 | 66 | 83 |
| 266 | The Doomsday Metric | 96 | 64 | 94 | 86 | 88 | 96 | 83 | 87 |
| Risk Management | | | | | | | | | |
| 267 | Security risk management maturity | 89 | 78 | 63 | 89 | 68 | 87 | 84 | 80 |
| 268 | Number of high/medium/low risks currently untreated/unresolved | 91 | 93 | 66 | 77 | 75 | 91 | 67 | 80 |
| 269 | Information security budget variance | 78 | 77 | 93 | 78 | 65 | 67 | 63 | 74 |
| 270 | Process/system fragility or vulnerability | 77 | 93 | 85 | 80 | 68 | 70 | 86 | 80 |
| 271 | Number of unpatched technical vulnerabilities | 81 | 90 | 93 | 92 | 72 | 96 | 95 | 88 |
| 272 | Information security risk scores | 96 | 71 | 76 | 94 | 88 | 74 | 81 | 83 |
| 273 | Total liability value of untreated/residual risks | 77 | 72 | 87 | 91 | 80 | 71 | 97 | 82 |
| 274 | Coupling index | 94 | 87 | 64 | 96 | 68 | 69 | 74 | 79 |
| 275 | Changes in network probe levels | 90 | 79 | 83 | 96 | 63 | 70 | 89 | 81 |
| 276 | Organizational and technical homogeneity | 73 | 88 | 65 | 90 | 92 | 92 | 87 | 84 |
| 277 | Percentage of controls working as defined | 84 | 90 | 88 | 93 | 93 | 74 | 88 | 87 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 278 | Organization's insurance coverage versus annual premiums | 95 | 69 | 70 | 89 | 79 | 81 | 66 | 78 |
| 279 | Number of attacks | 78 | 76 | 66 | 90 | 77 | 66 | 88 | 77 |
| Security policy metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 280 | Number of security policies, standards, procedures and metrics with committed owners | 69 | 64 | 69 | 77 | 86 | 88 | 88 | 77 |
| 281 | Security policy management maturity | 82 | 63 | 79 | 81 | 90 | 63 | 73 | 76 |
| 282 | Traceability of policies, control objectives, standards & procedures | 78 | 64 | 66 | 75 | 67 | 76 | 81 | 72 |
| 283 | Number of important operations with documented & tested security procedures | 85 | 85 | 70 | 80 | 76 | 90 | 89 | 82 |
| 284 | Comprehensiveness of security policy coverage | 64 | 69 | 83 | 94 | 66 | 71 | 80 | 75 |
| 285 | Policy coverage of frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27002 | 63 | 94 | 65 | 94 | 71 | 68 | 63 | 74 |
| 286 | Number or percentage of security policies addressing viable risks | 78 | 87 | 81 | 93 | 69 | 90 | 87 | 84 |
| 287 | Quality of security policies | 75 | 96 | 74 | 88 | 93 | 81 | 89 | 85 |
| 288 | Percentage of policy statements unambiguously linked to control objectives | 81 | 69 | 67 | 95 | 97 | 70 | 92 | 82 |
| 289 | Thud factor (policy verbosity/red tape index, waffle-o-meter) | 63 | 67 | 74 | 75 | 91 | 97 | 63 | 76 |
| 290 | Number of security policies whose review/reapproval is overdue | 73 | 82 | 87 | 95 | 72 | 79 | 90 | 83 |
| 291 | Flesch readability scores for policies, procedures, standards and guidelines | 63 | 83 | 85 | 96 | 92 | 87 | 87 | 85 |
| 292 | Number or percentage of security policies that are clear | 87 | 93 | 69 | 65 | 78 | 96 | 85 | 82 |
| 293 | Percentage of security policies that satisfy documentation standards | 64 | 88 | 74 | 87 | 65 | 72 | 97 | 78 |
| 294 | Number of security policies that are inconsistent with other policies or obligations | 81 | 67 | 80 | 91 | 76 | 81 | 68 | 78 |
| Situational awareness metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 295 | Are they preparing thoroughly to handle large-scale incidents or not | 84 | 94 | 81 | 74 | 87 | 72 | 74 | 81 |
| 296 | Establish and Maintain Accurate Notification Mechanisms | 96 | 69 | 70 | 91 | 85 | 74 | 97 | 83 |
| 297 | Develop Written Guidelines for Prioritizing Incidents | 82 | 77 | 83 | 76 | 73 | 89 | 77 | 80 |
| 298 | maximum response times incident response team | 88 | 92 | 64 | 94 | 94 | 96 | 78 | 87 |
| software security metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 299 | Software security maturity | 87 | 69 | 67 | 89 | 64 | 71 | 90 | 77 |
| 300 | Percentage of controls tested realistically | 69 | 94 | 96 | 97 | 97 | 96 | 96 | 92 |
| 301 | Software quality assurance | 83 | 92 | 68 | 63 | 70 | 93 | 73 | 77 |
| 302 | Quality of system security revealed by testing | 82 | 76 | 88 | 77 | 96 | 93 | 92 | 86 |

| | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 303 | Extent to which information security is incorporated in software QA | 78 | 74 | 74 | 88 | 90 | 93 | 71 | 81 |
| 304 | Extent to which QA is incorporated in information security processes | 80 | 92 | 75 | 77 | 92 | 78 | 97 | 84 |
| 305 | Percentage of configuration items in line with service levels for performance and security | 66 | 90 | 70 | 63 | 80 | 65 | 96 | 76 |
| 306 | Percentage of technical controls that fail-safe | 84 | 80 | 89 | 86 | 87 | 70 | 68 | 81 |
| 307 | Number of deviations identified between configuration repository and actual asset configurations | 70 | 86 | 68 | 97 | 75 | 85 | 86 | 81 |
| System and Communications Protection | | | | | | | | | |
| 308 | whether implementing system and communications protection policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance or not | 97 | 79 | 84 | 64 | 71 | 87 | 69 | 79 |
| System and services acquisition | | | | | | | | | |
| 309 | Determine how much of the product acquisition cost | 79 | 69 | 89 | 65 | 86 | 88 | 84 | 80 |
| System and information integrity | | | | | | | | | |
| 310 | whether implementing system and information integrity policy that addresses purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, coordination among organizational entities, and compliance or not | 88 | 69 | 82 | 78 | 65 | 71 | 77 | 76 |
| Vulnerability management metric | | | | | | | | | |
| 311 | Vulnerability Scanning Coverage | 85 | 78 | 71 | 88 | 66 | 66 | 76 | 76 |
| 312 | Percent of Systems with No Known Severe Vulnerabilities | 91 | 72 | 90 | 72 | 93 | 66 | 86 | 81 |
| 313 | Mean-Time to Mitigate Vulnerabilities | 87 | 80 | 92 | 64 | 95 | 75 | 86 | 83 |
| 314 | CVSS score | 80 | 70 | 63 | 83 | 86 | 67 | 74 | 75 |
| 315 | Number of Known Vulnerability Instances | 92 | 90 | 92 | 84 | 86 | 94 | 64 | 86 |
| 316 | Vulnerability index | 95 | 83 | 69 | 87 | 85 | 81 | 88 | 84 |
| 317 | Historical vulnerability metric | 90 | 70 | 95 | 69 | 91 | 68 | 91 | 82 |
| 318 | Historically exploited vulnerability metric | 81 | 64 | 84 | 87 | 92 | 80 | 79 | 81 |
| 319 | Future vulnerability metric | 90 | 92 | 65 | 67 | 79 | 80 | 76 | 78 |
| 320 | Future exploited vulnerability metric | 92 | 77 | 87 | 83 | 82 | 77 | 83 | 83 |
| 321 | Mean Cost to Mitigate Vulnerabilities | 75 | 63 | 97 | 73 | 85 | 96 | 73 | 80 |

Table 3: List of security metrics in 32 security domains

Security Metrics Framework

Recently, Igor Khokhlov et. al. [37] proposed a framework to evaluate the data quality and security in mobile phones. But, this proposed framework not provided any security level/score of app. To determine security score of mobile application, the authors proposed Mobile App Security Capability Maturity Model (MASCMM). MASCMM framework is a 4-step GAME (Goals, Actions, Metrics, Evaluation) process.

Goals: The initial step in MASCMM framework is goals. In this step, proposed framework mainly focuses on identifying security requirements, business drivers, objectives and security requirements. This step

focus on what security activity/activities in security control domain have to measure and what are the security practices to be followed. High level management plays a key role while deciding these goals.

Actions: After selecting security activities for measuring, now it's time to develop the security assessment. Identify the list of security metrics for measuring the security activity. The authors proposed security metrics based on GAP-GOES criteria. Establish the benchmarks for each security activity based on the organization goals. Collect necessary data for measuring security activity. Measurement methods will differ to every metric category. So, identify the metric category and measurement method.

Metrics: In the metrics step, select the security metrics to be measured in the list of GAP-GOES based security metrics.

Evaluation: In the evaluation step, measure the security score for each security activity and calculate the security score for each security control domain and then calculate the security score for mobile application. Now, based on the security score attained, determine the maturity level for each security control domain.

Level 1: Performed informally

This security level of maturity is defined as unorganized and unstructured. Processes are not well documented and information security efforts are not repeatable.

Level 2: well defined

This security level of maturity is defined as well defined and information security efforts are repeatable. Processes are standardized and documented. Simply we can say "audit-ready".

Level 3: Quantitatively controlled

This security level of maturity can be defined as quantitatively controlled. In addition to level 2, this level satisfies the metric-driven process. In this level, performance measures can be analyzed, managed and quantitatively known.

Level 4: Continuously improving

This security level of maturity can be defined as world-class practices. In addition to level 3, this level acquires the feature of continuously improving the process

The authors used standard template[NIST] for documenting the process of metric development and evaluation process. By using this standard template, organizations will easily identify the analysis and reports easily and also used for future reference. Sample template shown in below table and flowchart of MASCMM is shown in figure 4. After calculating security score of each security domain, represent all of them in a spider chart shows the secured zone of the app. For instance, we selected 5 security domains and measured each security activity using above process and figure 5 shows maturity level of each security domain and security zone (showed as dotted lines) of the app.




Figure 4: Flowchart of MASCMM

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Name of control family | Vulnerability management |
| Name of Metric | Vulnerability scanning coverage |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Status | Final |
| Description | Vulnerability Scanning Coverage (VSC) measures the percentage of the organization's systems under management that were checked for vulnerabilities during vulnerability scanning and identification processes. This metric is used to indicate the scope of vulnerability identification efforts. |
| Type | Technical |
| Audience | Security Operations |
| Question | What percentage of the organization's total systems has been checked for known vulnerabilities? |
| Answer | Positive integer value that is greater than or equal to zero but less than or equal to 100%. A value of "100%" indicates that all systems are covered by the vulnerability scanning process. |
| Formula | <p>Vulnerability Scanning Coverage is calculated by dividing the total number of systems scanned by the total number of systems within the metric scope such as the entire organization:</p> $VSC = \frac{\text{Count(Scanned_Systems)}}{\text{Count(All_Systems_Within_Organization)}} * 100$ |
| Units | Percentage of systems |
| Frequency | Weekly, Monthly, Quarterly, Annually |
| Targets | VSC values should trend higher over time. Higher values are obviously better as it means more systems have been checked for vulnerabilities. A value of 100% means that all the systems are checked in vulnerability scans. For technical and operational reasons, this number will likely be below the theoretical maximum. |
| Sources | Vulnerability management and asset management systems will provide information on which systems are scanned for vulnerabilities. |
| Visualization | <p>Bar Chart</p> <p>X-axis: Time (Week, Month, Quarter, Year)</p> <p>Y-axis: VSC (%)</p> |

Table 4: Template for specifying metric evaluation and its results




Figure 5: Security level of 5 security domains and security zone (showed in dotted lines) of the app

Results

Our R & D team (Centre for Mobile Banking, IDRB, India) started security testing of mobile applications especially banking applications. This constituted static testing and dynamic testing with the help of automated tools and manual testing. For identifying security flaws in the mobile apps, starting point was, use of CVSS score and number of known vulnerability instances as metrics. But now, with the improved model, a list of 321 metrics is provided to the organizations (Bankers) which the organizations select based on organization's business requirements depending on practical considerations, such as availability of data, time to measure, etc. This facilitates calculation of the security score of their app, that is aligned with their business objectives. Recently, one bank (bank name cannot be revealed for confidentiality and security reasons) selected 26 metrics in 6 security domains for calculating security level of their mobile app. Our team calculated those 26 metrics and gave the security level of that mobile app. Some of the mobile apps we tested and their security levels (after masking organization and app name details) are shown in table 5 below.

| S. No. | Name of mobile app (Name of the apps are renamed) | Total number of security domains selected | Total number of security metrics selected | Security level of mobile app |
|--------|--|---|---|------------------------------|
| 1 | App1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 2 | App2 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 3 | App3 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 4 | App4 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 5 | App5 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 6 | App6 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 7 | App7 | 1 | 1 | 4 |
| 8 | App8 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 9 | App9 | 1 | 1 | 3 |
| 10 | App10 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| 11 | App11 | 3 | 6 | 4 |
| 12 | App12 | 4 | 22 | 2 |
| 13 | App13 | 3 | 14 | 2 |
| 14 | App14 | 6 | 23 | 3 |
| 15 | App15 | 5 | 20 | 3 |
| 16 | App16 | 4 | 19 | 3 |
| 17 | App17 | 4 | 21 | 3 |
| 18 | App18 | 6 | 19 | 2 |
| 19 | App19 | 4 | 17 | 3 |
| 20 | App20 | 6 | 26 | 3 |

Table 5: Listing app wise security metrics calculated and its security levels

With this new model, we are creating awareness among, banks and other organizations, on these metrics and asking them to maintain necessary data for evaluating these metrics. This will facilitate improvement in their apps' security requirements (that are aligned with business requirements). We started testing with 1 metric and have now increased scope to testing with 26 metrics.

Conclusion

Usage of mobile apps is increasing. But, users don't know security score of the mobile app. In this work, authors proposed Mobile Application Security Maturity Model (MASCMM). By using MASCMM, app vendors/ organizations can calculate security score of the app. It is a 4-step GAME (Goals, Actions, Metrics and Evaluations) process. The authors identified 32 security domains and listed 321 security metrics in it. The authors defined GAP-GOES meta-metrics and based on this, derived security metrics. Based on the needs of an organization, users can select the security domains and security metrics; and evaluate the security score of security domain as well as an app and define the CMM level by using MASCMM. All the metric analysis, evaluations and results are documented in a standardized way.

Future Work

In this work, the authors proposed 321 non-functional security metrics. In future, these security metrics can be categorized based on type of mobile app. For example, if the mobile app intended for basic functionalities like Alarm, Notepad etc., we need not to check all 321 security metrics. So, in future, researchers can work on categorization of security metrics based on app functionality.

References

1. "How Many People Have Smartphones Worldwide (Dec 2020)." <https://www.bankmycell.com/blog/how-many-phones-are-in-the-world> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
2. "What Is Cybersecurity? - Cisco." <https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/products/security/what-is-cybersecurity.html> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
3. P. E. Black, K. Scarfone, and M. Souppaya, "CYBER SECURITY METRICS AND MEASURES," 2008. Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://www.nist.gov/publications/cyber-security-metrics-and-measures>.
4. Irc, "INFOSEC Research Council (IRC) Hard Problems List," *Distribution*, no. November, p. 57, 2005, [Online]. Available: http://www.cyber.st.dhs.gov/docs/IRC_Hard_Problem_List.pdf.
5. W. Brothby and G. Hinson, *Pragmatic security metrics: applying metametrics to information security*. 2013.
6. S. Chen *et al.*, "Are mobile banking apps secure? what can be improved?," *ESEC/FSE 2018 - Proc. 2018 26th ACM Jt. Meet. Eur. Softw. Eng. Conf. Symp. Found. Softw. Eng.*, vol. 2018, pp. 797–802, 2018, doi: 10.1145/3236024.3275523.
7. D. E. Krutz, N. Munaiah, A. Meneely, and S. A. Malachowsky, "Examining the relationship between security metrics and user ratings of mobile apps: A case study," *WAMA 2016 - Proc. Int. Work. App Mark. Anal. co-located with FSE 2016*, pp. 8–14, 2016, doi: 10.1145/2993259.2993260.
8. A. Rahman, P. Pradhan, A. Partho, and L. Williams, "Predicting Android Application Security and Privacy Risk with Static Code Metrics," *Proc. - 2017 IEEE/ACM 4th Int. Conf. Mob. Softw. Eng. Syst. MOBILESoft 2017*, pp. 149–153, 2017, doi: 10.1109/MOBILESoft.2017.14.
9. G. Catolino, P. Salza, C. Gravino, and F. Ferrucci, "A Set of Metrics for the Effort Estimation of Mobile Apps," *Proc. - 2017 IEEE/ACM 4th Int. Conf. Mob. Softw. Eng. Syst. MOBILESoft 2017*, pp. 194–198, 2017, doi: 10.1109/MOBILESoft.2017.31.
10. R. M. Savola, P. Savolainen, A. Evesti, H. Abie, and M. Sihvonen, "Risk-driven security metrics development for an e-health IoT application," *2015 Inf. Secur. South Africa - Proc. ISSA 2015 Conf.*, vol. 1, pp. 0–5, 2015, doi: 10.1109/ISSA.2015.7335061.
11. "M. Whitman and H. Mattord, Management of information... - Google Scholar." https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=M.+Whitman+and+H.+Mattord%2C+Management+of+information+security%2C+Cengage+Learning%2C+2013&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).

12. M. Carr, "Public-private partnerships in national cyber-security strategies," 2016. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12504.
13. "M. Gasser, Building a secure computer system, Van... - Google Scholar." https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=M.+Gasser%2C+Building+a+secure+computer+system%2C+Van+Nostrand+Reinhold+Company+New+York%2C+NY%2C+1988.&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
14. D. Craigen, N. Diakun-Thibault, ... R. P.-I. M., and undefined 2014, "Defining cybersecurity," *timreview.ca*, Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://timreview.ca/article/835>.
15. I. Atoum, A. A. Ootom, and A. Ootom, "A Classification Scheme for Cybersecurity Models A Computational Approach for Predicting Software Quality in Use From Software Reviews View project CMMI implementation View project A Classification Scheme for Cybersecurity Models A Classification Scheme for Cybersecurity Models," *Int. J. Secur. Its Appl.*, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 109–120, 2017, doi: 10.14257/ijisia.2017.11.1.10.
16. W. Humphrey, "Managing the software process," 1989, Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=64795>.
17. N. T. Le and D. B. Hoang, "CAPABILITY MATURITY MODEL AND METRICS FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER CLOUD SECURITY." Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/handle/10453/121301>.
18. A. Arabsorkhi, F. G.-2018 9th I. S. on, and undefined 2018, "Security Metrics: Principles and Security Assessment Methods," *ieeexplore.ieee.org*, Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/8661030/>.
19. "Jilin, G.: SSE-CMM Security Metrics. NIST and CSSPAB... - Google Scholar." https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Jilin%2C+G.%3A+SSE-CMM+Security+Metrics.+NIST+and+CSSPAB+Workshop%2C+Washington%2C+D.C.%2C+June+%282000%29&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
20. D. Gollmann, F. Massacci, and A. Yautsiukhin, *Quality of protection: Security measurements and metrics*. 2008.
21. R. Barabanov, S. Kowalski, and L. Yngström, "Information Security Metrics State of the Art," 2011. Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2:469570>.
22. "Chapin, D. A. & Akridge, S.. How can security be... - Google Scholar." https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Chapin%2C+D.+A.+%26+Akridge%2C+S.+How+can+security+be+measured%3F+Information+Systems+Control+Journal%2C+http%3A%2F%2Fwww.isaca.org%2FJournal%2FPast-Issues%2F2005%2FVolume-2%2FPage+s%2Fdefault.aspx+%282005%29.&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
23. "A guide to security metrics, SANS Security Essentials... - Google Scholar." https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=A+guide+to+security+metrics%2C+SANS+Security+Essentials+GSEC+Practical+Assignment+Version%2C+1+%282010%29.&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
24. G. Campbell, ... M. B. of the I. A., and undefined 2014, "Building a metrics program that matters.," *europemc.org*, Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: <https://europemc.org/article/med/24707764>.
25. "Kark, K., et al. "Defining an effective security... - Google Scholar." https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Kark%2C+K.%2C+et+al.+%22Defining+a+n+effective+security+metrics+program.%22+Forrester+Research+%282007%29.&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
26. M. Whitman and H. Mattord, "Principles of Information Security Fourth Edition," 2011. Accessed: Dec. 09, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://books.google.co.in/books?hl=en&lr=&id=xboIAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PR9&dq=Whitman,+Michael+E.,+and+Herbert+J.+Mattord.+Principles+of+information+security.+Cengage+Learning,+2011.&ots=ov2-XYX9Um&sig=nax_kqvzFUiTJRbnnrAdZYSrcuw.

27. E. Chew *et al.*, “Performance M NIST Special Publication 800-55 Revision 1 Measurement Guide for Information Security,” 2008. doi: 10.5555/2206269.
28. “Security Metrics Development and Implementation Based on NIST Directives | Types | Pearson IT Certification.” <https://www.pearsonitcertification.com/articles/article.aspx?p=1675146> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
29. “ISO - ISO/IEC 27001 — Information security management.” <https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
30. “About O-ISM3 | Information Security Management using O-ISM3.” <https://www.ism3.com/node/42> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
31. “ITScore for Information Security.” <https://www.gartner.com/en/documents/3231718/itscore-for-information-security> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
32. “Security Framework and Risk Assessment Services | IBM.” <https://www.ibm.com/security/services/security-framework-and-risk-assessment> (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
33. R. Caralli, J. Allen, and D. White, *CERT Resilience Management Model-CERT-RMM: A Maturity Model for Managing Operational Resilience*. 2016.
34. “Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model White Paper,” 2014.
35. “Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, Version 1.1,” Gaithersburg, MD, Apr. 2018. doi: 10.6028/NIST.CSWP.04162018.
36. “Curtis, Pamela, Nader Mehravari, and James Stevens.... - Google Scholar.” https://scholar.google.co.in/scholar?hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5&q=Curtis%2C+Pamela%2C+Nader+Mehravari%2C+and+James+Stevens.+Cybersecurity+capability+maturity+model+for+information+technology+services+%28c2m2+for+it+services%29%2C+version+1.0.+No.+CMU%2FSEI-2015-TR-009.+CARNEGIE-MELLON+UNIV+PITTSBURGH+PA+PITTSBURGH+United+States%2C+2015.&btnG= (accessed Dec. 09, 2020).
37. I. Khokhlov, L. Reznik, and S. Chuprov, “Framework for Integral Data Quality and Security Evaluation in Smartphones,” *IEEE Syst. J.*, pp. 1–8, 2020, doi: 10.1109/jsyst.2020.2985343.